Socratic Irony
1. Was there an element of irony in Socrates’ dialogues? Was he entirely engaged in a search for truth, or was he laughing at the ignorance of his interlocutors?
2. There has been a considerable debate in the scholarly literature on the question.
3. I.F. Stone’s opinion (pg. 80): “The most humiliating- and infuriating- part of the Socratic method of interrogation was that their (the interlocutors’) ignorance was shown to be real while they felt that his self-proclaimed ignorance was ostentatious and pretended…This was the famous Socratic ‘irony’.”
4. Emily Wilson’s agrees (in her The Death of Socrates):
A. Irony- false modesty- pretending it was free discussion but was secretly trying to prove the other wrong- too clever by half
B. The method of the elenchus-questioning of those who claim knowledge –was more a search for ignorance than for truth
C. Perhaps Socrates genuinely did not know how to define virtues , but he did know more than most in that he knew that some common beliefs were wrong, and knew that he himself did not know
D. Contrast between human, limited, technical knowledge/wisdom, and divine wisdom
E. She concludes that it’s difficult to reconcile his claim to know little with his confident, ethical prescriptions elsewhere in later dialogues
5. I disagree, and follow largely on the arguments of G. Vlastos:
A. He does not choose his interlocutors at random, but speaks only with those who claim knowledge
B. The dialogues never mention an instance in which the interlocutor takes Socrates to task for his refusal to state his own, positive beliefs
C. Socrates never turns to a third party in the dialogues to comment on his interlocutor’s ignorance or confusion
D. Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge of how to define the virtues is consistent with his view of knowledge, and is not a mask for irony
1. is not a clever device to deceive, to win arguments, or to force others to disclose what he is unwilling to disclose.
2. Instead, in the moral domain, there is nothing he claims to know with certainty
3. But, when knowledge = ‘justified true belief’, justified through the method of elenetic argument, he does claim knowledge
4. Not just to destroy the interlocutor’s conceit of knowledge, but to worm it out of them- show them that it doesn’t follow from their own premises- “say what you believe”- he expects to turn up true, more fundamental beliefs that entail the negation of what they first stated
5. Such a truth-seeking device cannot yield certainty, for one can’t be certain that the interlocutor does have a more fundamental and true moral belief- the solution to the paradox of Socrates and his claim not to have knowledge. The moral truth was always in his interlocutors- just needed the elencthus to allow both Socrates and his interlocutor to arrive at the truth
6. No intent to deceive, to merely show up the loser- by the nature of elencthus, he can only find the truth if he can show the interlocutor how the interlocutor’s truths don’t hang together
E. His disavowal of teaching also rings true to me
1. No, he does not simply transfer his knowledge to his student’s head
2. Teaching in other senses: engaging in elenetic argument with his students so that they may learn their own ignorance; and,
3. Allowing them to discover for themselves some justified true belief
4. Not that he doesn’t care that his students know the truth, but he cares much more that if a student is to come to the truth it must be by himself and for himself: moral autonomy